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“Pecunia nervus belli.”
1 Introduction
As popularized by Frank and Cook’s (1995) best-selling book “The Winner-
Take-All Society” many competitive situations in modern economies take
the form of a contest. Examples include political lobbying, research and
development, marketing, promotion, status-seeking, and litigation activities
(Konrad 2009). In this paper, we are interested in the eﬀect of wealth in
contests. In particular, the motivation for our analysis is general questions
such as: Do rich people lobby more? Does low economic growth and wealth
inequality induce additional conflicts?
The relationship between wealth and power has attracted attention for
centuries (Marx 1867, Wright Mills 1956). The conventional wisdom suggests
that the rich are more powerful than the poor.1 Bartels (2005) concludes, for
instance, that US senators appear to be considerably more responsive to the
opinions of their more aﬄuent constituents. Nevertheless, in contrast, ca-
sual observation suggests that low wealth induces greater participation and
eﬀort in contest-type situations. People involved in highly predatory and
competitive activities, such as thieves or athletes for instance, typically come
from poorer segments of society. More corruption is also typically observed
in poorer countries (Aidt 2009, Gundlach and Paldam 2009). Some groups
(e.g., farmers), although often relatively poor, are well-known to be politically
powerful. As a result, redistributive politics almost always goes from the rich
to the poor. Poverty has also been found to be a robust factor in explain-
ing violent crime and civil conflicts (Collier and Hoeﬄer 1998, Fajnzylberg,
Lederman and Loayza 2002, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Blattman and Miguel
2010). Relatedly, it is often said that redistribution policies favour political
1This is consistent with the beliefs of some prominent economists. For instance, Anne
Krueger (1974), in her pioneering work on rent seeking argues that we can perceive the price
system “as a mechanism rewarding the rich and well-connected”. Likewise Jack Hirshleifer
(1995) stresses that “the half of the population above the median wealth surely has greater
political strength than the half below”. Paul Krugman (2010) similarly observes that “the
rich are diﬀerent from you and me: they have more influence”. Lastly, Daron Acemoglu
(2012) declares that “the rise in inequality has created a class of very wealthy citizens who
can use their wealth to gain more political power – partly to defend their wealth and
partly to further their economic, political, and ideological agendas”.
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stability and social peace.
Although these observations concern many disparate issues, they suggest
that wealth may have fundamentally diﬀerent, and perhaps opposing, eﬀects
in contests. Economic theory may then help us to think straightforwardly
about which basic wealth eﬀects should dominate under particular condi-
tions. Accordingly, what do we know from economic theory about wealth
eﬀects in contests? Surprisingly, not much. Indeed the question of the eﬀect
of wealth in contests has received little attention in the (otherwise vast) the-
oretical literature on contests (Tullock 1980, Garfinkel and Skaperdas 2007,
Konrad 2009, Congleton, Hillman and Konrad 2010). In all likelihood, there
is probably a quite simple explanation. Consider, the “workhorse” model in
this literature based on a strategic game where each agent has the following
payoﬀ function:
 =  −  +Π (1)
in which  is agent ’s eﬀort,  is the rent (i.e., the prize) for the contest
winner and Π is the probability of winning the contest. Notice immediately
then that individual wealth  enters additively in the payoﬀ function (1),
and thus has no eﬀect on the agent’s eﬀort (which is then, without loss of
generality, usually set to zero in the literature).
The primary objective of this paper is to adapt this basic contest model
minimally in order to examine the wealth eﬀects. To do so, we introduce a
utility function that displays the familiar property of the decreasing marginal
utility of wealth. This allows us to capture the two most basic wealth eﬀects
we believe should naturally arise in contests:
• First, wealth can reduce the marginal cost of eﬀort. To illustrate, note
that it is marginally less costly for a rich person than a poor person
to oﬀer a monetary payment to, e.g., a politician, in order to obtain
some privilege. The rich can thus relatively more easily aﬀord costly
expenditures in a contest than the poor, other things being equal.
• Second, and in contrast to the first eﬀect, wealth may decrease the
marginal benefit of winning a contest. To illustrate, note that it is
marginally more beneficial for the poor to obtain the monetary reward
associated with victory in a contest. We may thus regard the poor as
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being relatively more motivated to exert eﬀort in a contest than the
rich, other things being equal.
In this paper, we consider in Section 3 a model in which only the first ef-
fect on marginal cost is active, the so-called “privilege contest” model. In this
model, eﬀort is monetary, but the rent –i.e., the privilege– is non-monetary
and therefore its marginal value is independent of the level of wealth. We
then consider in Section 4 a model in which only the second eﬀect on the
marginal benefit is active, the so-called “ability contest” model. In this al-
ternative model, rent is monetary but eﬀort –which determines ability– is
non-monetary and so the marginal cost of eﬀort is independent of wealth.
According to our intuition, the eﬀect of increasing wealth on agent eﬀort
is positive in the privilege contest model while it is negative in the ability
contest model. We also examine the eﬀect of wealth redistribution in both
models, and find that this tends to decrease aggregate eﬀort when the deci-
siveness of the contest (to be defined precisely in Section 2) is suﬃciently low.
We then move to study in Section 5 a model in which the two eﬀects play
a simultaneous role, the so-called “rent-seeking contest” model, correspond-
ing to the rent-seeking model with risk aversion (Cornes and Hartley 2012).
In this model, we show that under constant absolute risk aversion (CARA),
the two opposing wealth eﬀects discussed earlier exactly oﬀset each other so
that wealth has no eﬀect on the eﬀorts of agents. Moreover, we show that
wealth tends to increase eﬀort if more background risk increases risk aversion.
This provides a suﬃcient condition on the utility function (due to Eeckhoudt,
Gollier and Schlesinger 1996), which is stronger than decreasing absolute risk
aversion (DARA), for signing the eﬀect of wealth in the rent-seeking contest
model. We also show that under this condition, a rich agent exerts relatively
more eﬀort than a poor agent, and that an isolated increase in the wealth of
the rich agent always increases that agent’s eﬀort, but reduces the eﬀort of
the poor agent.
Finally, in Section 6 we discuss other possible wealth eﬀects identified
in the literature (Grossman 1991, Hirshleifer 1991, Skaperdas and Gan 1995,
Che and Gale 1997). Section 7 concludes our analysis. In the next section, we
define the general set-up of our models and derive some preliminary results.
5
2 General set-up and preliminary results
In our analysis, we study the eﬀects of several types of wealth changes:
namely, an increase in the wealth of a single player, an increase in the wealth
of all players, along with an increase in wealth inequality in the form of a
mean-preserving spread (MPS) of the distribution of wealth across players.
We examine the wealth eﬀects both on each player’s respective eﬀort and on
aggregate eﬀort. Moreover, we compare the relative eﬀort of a rich player
to that of a poor player within an equilibrium. We first present some pre-
liminary results about the conditions that determine the sign of all these
wealth eﬀects in a general class of strategic models. This class includes the
three contest models considered in the remainder of the paper.2 Theorem
1 below provides a simple single crossing property that will turn out to be
instrumental throughout the paper, while Theorem 2 derives a condition for
signing the eﬀect of a MPS in wealth. Section 2.2 discusses the assumptions
on and properties of the contest success function (CSF).
2.1 Preliminary results
We consider a strategic game with two players,  =  , in which the only
source of heterogeneity is wealth . We assume without loss of generality
that  is more wealthy than :  ≥  (with  =  corresponding to the
symmetric situation). It is convenient to denote the best-response functions
as ( ) and ( ) for players  and , respectively, where  denotes
the eﬀort of player . We assume that these best-response functions are
single-valued and continuous in their arguments. The eﬀort levels ( )
constitute an equilibrium for the game with initial wealth ( ) when
 = (( ) ) (2)
 = (( ) ) (3)
We write ( ) and ( ) as the equilibrium eﬀort levels for this
game and assume the existence of a unique interior equilibrium. Building on
2Our strategic contest models belong to the class of “aggregative games” for which
each individuals’ payoﬀs only depend on their own eﬀort and on the aggregate eﬀorts of
all players. It has been shown that aggregative games display special features that make
their analysis simpler under some conditions (Bergstrom and Varian 1985, Corchon 1994,
Acemoglu and Jensen 2013). Nevertheless, it is not clear how these features are useful for
studying systematically the various wealth eﬀects we examine in this paper. In fact, the
following preliminary results are fairly general, and not restricted to aggregative games.
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the literature (Szidarovszky and Okuguchi 1997, Yamazaki 2009), we discuss
in detail these equilibrium properties in the appendix for our three contest
models.
We now introduce the following single-crossing property.3
Theorem 1 Suppose that  =  =⇒ ()  ()() . Then   =⇒ ( )  ()( ).
This theorem implies that when () |=  () |=, player exerts more eﬀort than player . Thus, to compare within an equilibrium
the relative eﬀort of the rich and poor players, it is suﬃcient to examine at
the symmetric equilibrium how each player comparatively reacts to an in-
crease in the wealth of player .
We have characterized a property of the equilibrium in an asymmetric
game. In addition, we assume in the following that the condition 1−11 ≥ 0
is always satisfied. Note that this is the case if we assume that the equilib-
rium is locally stable, or |11|  1 (see, e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston and
Green 1995, p. 414). We discuss this condition in detail in the appendix for
our three contest models.
Implicit diﬀerentiation of (2)-(3) gives the eﬀects of isolated increases in
wealth:

 =
2
1− 11  (4)

 =
12
1− 11  (5)

 =
12
1− 11  (6)

 =
2
1− 11  (7)
where the numerical subscripts with  and  denote partial derivatives and
these functions are all evaluated at equilibrium. Thus, an increase in 
increases player ’s eﬀort if and only if (“iﬀ” hereafter) 2  0 and increases
3All theorems are proven in the appendix.
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player’s  eﬀort iﬀ 12  0. The corresponding eﬀects on aggregate eﬀort
are 
 +

 =
2(1 + 1)
1− 11 , and

 +

 =
2(1 + 1)
1− 11  (8)
In a symmetric equilibrium (SE),  =  ( = 1 2). In that case, the change
in individual eﬀort following a common wealth increase is

 |
SE
d=d =
2
1− 1  (9)
Finally, when wealth is redistributed from  to , d = −d. Then
d
d |d=−d =
2 − 12
1− 11 , and
d
d |d=−d =
12 − 2
1− 11 
In a symmetric equilibrium, a wealth transfer from  to  has no first-order
eﬀect on aggregate eﬀort since
d
d |
SE
d=−d = −
d
d |
SE
d=−d =
2
1 + 1 
The second-order eﬀect of such a MPS in wealth is given by the following
theorem.
Theorem 2 Consider a symmetric equilibrium. Let the stability condition
21  1 be satisfied. The second-order eﬀect of a MPS in wealth d = −d
on aggregate eﬀort  +  is given by
(2)211 − 2(1 + 1)212 + (1 + 1)222
(1 + 1)(1− 21 )  (10)
The numerator is a quadratic form in the Hessian of (·).4 The denominator
is positive under the stability condition.
4It can be written as
£ −2 1 + 1 ¤ ∙ 11 1212 22
¸ ∙ −2
1 + 1
¸
. Moreover, it can be
easily checked that this form equals zero under the conditions identified in the theorem
in Bergstrom and Varian (1985, p. 717). These conditions ensure that the distribution of
agent characteristics has no eﬀect on aggregate eﬀort.
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2.2 The contest success function
In standard strategic contest games, the contested rent, , is indivisible in
the sense that the winner takes all, Moreover, the players exert eﬀorts, de-
noted  ( =  ) to increase the probability of winning the rent (Nitzan
1994). For any player , the probability of winning the contest, i.e., the CSF,
is denoted Π ≡ Π( ). Very often, we will denote the probability of 
winning as ( ) such that Π = 1−( ), and the results will be given
in terms of restrictions on (the derivatives of) ( ). It is well known that
the CSF plays a key role in strategic contest models, and this will also be
the case in our analysis. We discuss here some of its key properties.
We assume throughout that the CSF has the standard logistic form,5 i.e.,
( ) = Φ()Φ() + Φ() (11)
with   0 ( =  ) and with ΦΦ0  0. While this CSF is increasing in
its arguments, concavity is only guaranteed for arbitrary eﬀort levels when
Φ is concave. Therefore, we also assume throughout Φ00 ≤ 0, but emphasize
that several of our results do not rely on this assumption. The properties
of a logistic (·) are given in the appendix. Here, we draw attention to the
important fact that
12 = 
2
 =
(Φ()−Φ())Φ0()Φ0()
(Φ() + Φ())3 (12)
meaning that the marginal productivity of one player’s eﬀort is enhanced by
the other player’s eﬀort iﬀ the former exerts additional eﬀort. This helps
explain why the strategic models we consider are neither games of strategic
complements nor that of strategic substitutes. In fact, as in Acemoglu and
Jensen (2013), some interesting features arise in our contest models because
the change in the eﬀort of one player will either increase the eﬀort of the
other player (when this player wants to “keep up”) or decrease this eﬀort
(because this other player “gives up”).
In some parts of the analysis, we further specify the CSF to consider the
following power-logistic form (Tullock 1980):
5Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) and Konrad (2009) provide discussion of the axiomatic
foundations and economic illustrations for this special, but common, class of CSF.
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( ) = 

 +  
where   0 is the “contest-decisiveness” parameter measuring how impor-
tant relative eﬀort ( ) is compared to random factors for winning the contest
(Hirshleifer 1991). If → 0, each player wins the contest with probability 1
2
independently of the levels of eﬀort. Conversely, if →∞, the player with
the largest eﬀort almost certainly wins the contest.6 Note that Φ00 ≤ 0 is
equivalent to  ≤ 1. We now turn to the three types of contest mentioned
in the Introduction, starting with the privilege contest.
3 The privilege contest model
In the privilege contest model, the rent is non-monetary. Our chief interpre-
tation is that the benefit from winning the contest is only associated with a
form of prestige (or “ego-utility”), without any financial counterpart. This
model of contest may include, for instance, status-seeking activities or polit-
ical campaigns or warfare for purely ideological motives.
Denoting the non-monetary benefit of the privilege as , we model the
preferences of player  (=  ) with wealth  and exerting eﬀort  as
 = ( − ) +Π (13)
We assume that (·) is concave, which ensures that the marginal willingness
to pay for the privilege in terms of consumption, Π0 , is decreasing (along
the indiﬀerence curve) in consumption.7 Furthermore, we can express the
dependency of this willingness to pay on wealth in terms of the coeﬃcients
of absolute risk aversion,  def= −00(−)0(−) , and absolute prudence,  def=
−000(−)00(−) :
(−dd |d=0)
 =
Π
0 , and
2(−dd |d=0)
2 =
Π
0 (2 − ) (14)
6Hwang (2009) provides an idea about the order of magnitude of . Using data from
battles fought in 17th century Europe and during World War II, he obtains values of .704
(.120) and 3.420 (.678), respectively (standard errors in brackets).
7As −dd |d=0 = Π0 ,  (−dd |d=0)|d=0 =
Π20
000  0
10
In this model, the key property compared with the subsequent contest mod-
els is that the marginal benefit of exerting eﬀort is independent of wealth.
Player ’s best response ( ) is defined by the necessary first- and
second-order conditions
−0( − ( )) + 1(( ) ) = 0
00( − ( )) + 11(( ) )  0
Simple comparative statics show that
1 = − 12( )00( − ) + 11( ) and
2 = 
00( − )
00( − ) + 11( )  0,
where the inequality follows from the concavity of  and the second-order
condition. Therefore player ’s best response increases when that player’s
wealth increases; i.e., eﬀort is a normal good. The intuition is simple. When
wealth increases, the marginal cost of exerting eﬀort decreases (due to de-
creasing marginal utility) while the marginal benefit is unaﬀected. Likewise,
player ’s best response ( ) satisfies the necessary first- and second-
order conditions
−0( − ( ))− 2( ( )) = 0
00( − ( ))− 22( ( ))  0
Diﬀerentiating with respect to  and , we obtain
1 = −12( )−00( − ) + 22( ) 
2 = −
00( − )
−00( − ) + 22( )  0
At a symmetric equilibrium, 12 = 0 (cf. (12)) and therefore 1 = 1 = 0.
Hence, at a symmetric equilibrium

 = 2  0 and

 = 0
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and relying on Theorem 1 we can conclude that    iﬀ   . In view
of (12), we can also conclude that 12  0. As a result, an isolated increase
in the wealth of the poor player, , increases both the equilibrium eﬀort of
that player (cf. (7) and 2  0) as well as that of the rich player (cf. (6)
and 1 2  0). Hence, total equilibrium eﬀorts also increase. Alternatively,
an increase in the wealth of the rich player, , increases that player’s own
equilibrium eﬀort (cf. (4) and 2  0) but reduces that of the poor player, 
(cf. (5) and 1  0  2). We know from (8) that this total eﬀect depends
on (1 + 1). Observe now that 1 + 1  0 iﬀ
[12( )− 22( )]   −00( − ),
which, using the first-order condition for player , may be written as
( ) def= 12( )− 22( )−2( )   (15)
This inequality indicates that the eﬀect of a unilateral increase in the wealth
of the rich player on total eﬀort depends on the properties of the CSF and
of the utility function. Note that this inequality is more likely to be satisfied
when the elasticity of the marginal willingness to pay for  is large. But under
our assumptions on Φ for the logistic CSF (11), we always have ( )  0
(see the appendix). Therefore the inequality (15) is always satisfied. Under
the power-logistic function, the (  ) combinations that result in  = 0 are
plotted in Figure 1. Observe that ( )  0 holds for values of  below
1, while only ( )   is required.
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Figure 1. Combinations of relative eﬀort ( ) and the decisiveness
parameter  such that ( ) = 0.
We summarize this discussion as follows.
Proposition 1 In the privilege contest model with unequal wealth, the rich
player exerts more eﬀort than the poor player. An isolated increase in the
poor player’s wealth always increases the equilibrium eﬀorts of both players.
An isolated increase in the rich player’s wealth has a negative eﬀect on the
eﬀort of the poor player, but a positive eﬀect on total eﬀorts.
Figure 2 illustrates these results, representing the best-response functions
of players  and . Note that these functions are first increasing and then
decreasing, with a maximum at  = . Point A represents a symmetric
equilibrium with uniform low wealth ( =  = ), while point D repre-
sents a symmetric equilibrium with uniform high wealth ( =  = ).
Point B represents an equilibrium with  = b   = , and the move
from B to C illustrates the eﬀect of an increase in  from  to b. Point E
is the result of an increase in  from b to . Total eﬀorts increase, despite
the fact that the poor exerts less eﬀort than in B.
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Figure 2. Equilibria in the privilige contest model for diﬀerent wealth
combinations.
What happens under uniformwealth growth? With unequal initial wealth,
total eﬀort will change with
(1− 11)(d + d) = [(1 + 1) 2 + (1 + 1) 2]d log (16)
where dlog denotes the common growth rate in wealth. Thus, the same
suﬃcient condition for total eﬀort to increase when  gets richer, ensures that
total eﬀort is a normal good. In a symmetric game,  =  and therefore
 = , so that (16) reduces to
(d + d) = 22d log  0 (17)
This leads to the following result.
Proposition 2 If (15) holds, a common increase in wealth increases total
eﬀort in the privilege contest model. With equal wealth, a common increase
in wealth always increases the eﬀorts of both players.
We finally discuss the eﬀects of wealth inequality. From Proposition 1,
we observe that decreasing (increasing) inequality in the sense of making the
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poor (rich) richer increases total eﬀort. Therefore, there is no systematic
relationship between wealth inequality and eﬀort in the privilege contest
model. Now we study the eﬀect of more wealth inequality when total wealth
is constant. More precisely, we study the eﬀect of a MPS in wealth. We
can then invoke Theorem 2. In the Appendix, we prove the following result
holds for a power-logistic CSF and involves the coeﬃcients of absolute risk
aversion  and prudence  defined at the symmetric equilibrium.
Theorem 3 In the privilege contest model with a power-logistic CSF, the
sign of the quadratic form (10) is positive iﬀ
2(1−2)   (18)
First, note that this inequality may also be written as 2−   22.
Thus, if the marginal willingness to pay for rent is concave in final wealth
(cf. (14)), a small MPS in wealth reduces total eﬀort. When  is quadratic,
 = 0, and the inequality reduces to   1. When  is CARA,  = 
and the inequality reduces to   2−12 ' 707. Thus the quadratic and
CARA cases illustrate cases where the value of the decisiveness parameter of
the CSF determines whether the eﬀect of a MPS in wealth on total eﬀort is
positive or negative. If we multiply (18) by ( − ), we may replace  and
 by −00(−)0(−) ( − ) and −
000(−)
00(−) ( − ), the coeﬃcients of relative risk
aversion and relative prudence, respectively. When (·) has constant relative-
risk aversion (CRRA) denoted by , the inequality reduces to (1
2
−2)  1
2
.
We summarize these findings as follows.
Proposition 3 In the privilege contest model with a power-logistic CSF, a
small MPS in wealth increases total eﬀort iﬀ (18) is positive. Under CARA
(resp. quadratic) preferences, this arises iﬀ   1√
2
(resp. iﬀ   1). When
 has CRRA , this takes place iﬀ (1
2
−2)  1
2
. If the marginal willingness
to pay for the rent is concave in final wealth, this never happens.
These results indicate that a low decisiveness of the CSF is needed for a
small MPS in wealth to increase aggregate eﬀort.
4 The ability contest model
In the ability contest model, eﬀort is non-monetary. Our principal interpre-
tation is a situation in which players exert physical or mental eﬀorts that
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increase their abilities, and thus put them in a better position to win a con-
test. Competitive sports, but also education filters, are examples of such
contests.
In this model, player ’s expected utility equals
Π( + ) + (1−Π)()− ()
with 0  0 and 00 ≥ 0. As before, we assume that (·) is concave, which
represents decreasing marginal utility of wealth (or risk aversion). The key
property in this contest model is that the marginal cost of exerting eﬀort is
independent of wealth.
The best response of player , ( ), is defined by the necessary first-
and second-order conditions
1(( ) )∆ − 0(( )) = 0
11(( ) )∆ − 00(( ))  0
where ∆ def= (+ )−()  0 ( =  ), and similar definitions for ∆0
and ∆00 . Simple comparative statics show that
1 = − 12∆11∆ − 00() and 2 = −
1∆0
11∆ − 00()  0,
where the inequality follows from the concavity of (·) and the second-order
condition. Player ’s best response is now an inferior good. The intuition
is simple. An increase in wealth decreases the marginal benefit of eﬀort,
but has no eﬀect on the marginal cost. Similarly, player ’s best response
( ) satisfies the necessary first- and second-order conditions
−2( ( ))∆ − 0(( )) = 0
−22( ( ))∆ − 00(( ))  0
and diﬀerentiating with respect to  and  yields
1 = −21∆22∆ + 00() , and 2 =
−2∆0
22∆ + 00()  0
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Again, at a symmetric equilibrium, 12 = 0 and therefore 1 = 1 = 0. Hence,
at a symmetric equilibrium (cf. (4) and (5))

 = 2  0 =

 
and Theorem 1 allows us to conclude that    iﬀ   . Unlike the
privilege contest model, the rich player now exerts less eﬀort than the poor
player. At such an asymmetric equilibrium, 12  0.
An increase in player ’s wealth reduces that player’s equilibrium eﬀort
(cf. (4) and 2  0). And because 12  0, the equilibrium eﬀort of the
poorer player, , will also fall (cf. (5) and 2  0  1): that is, the poorer
player’s eﬀort is a strategic complement to that of the richer player. Total
equilibrium eﬀort then unambiguously declines (2(1+1)
1−11  0).
Conversely, an isolated increase in the wealth of the poor player, , reduces
that player’s own equilibrium eﬀort, (cf (7) and 2  0), but increases the
equilibrium eﬀort of the rich player (cf. (6) and 1 2  0). Without further
restrictions, the sign of the eﬀect on total equilibrium eﬀort, 2(1+1)
1−11 , is then
ambiguous. Using the first-order condition for , we show that a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for 1 + 1 to be positive if
11 − 12
1 
00()
0()  (19)
For the logistic CSF, it results that 11−121 = ( )  0 and we therefore
obtain a similar suﬃcient condition as for the privilege contest model (see
the appendix; for the power-logistic CSF, see Figure 1, but with  now on
the horizontal axis). This leads to the following result.
Proposition 4 In the ability contest model with unequal wealth, the rich
player exerts less eﬀort than the poor player. An isolated increase in the
rich player’s wealth always reduces the equilibrium eﬀort of both players. An
isolated increase in the poor player’s wealth has a positive eﬀect on the eﬀort
of the rich player, but a negative eﬀect on total eﬀort.
Figure 3 depicts the results obtained in this section. It should be remem-
bered that an increase in wealth decreases the best-response functions in the
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ability contest model. Thus, point A represents a symmetric equilibrium
with low wealth ( =  = ), and so the move from A to D illustrates
the eﬀect of a common increase in wealth from  to . Similarly, point B
represents an equilibrium with  = b   = , and the move from B to E
illustrates the eﬀect of an increase in , resulting in a downward adjustment
in both eﬀort levels. The move from B to C on the other hand, represents an
increase in  from  to b, resulting in opposing adjustments in the eﬀort
levels of the two players.
Figure 3. Equilibria in the ability contest model for diﬀerent wealth
combinations.
With initially unequal wealth, general wealth growth aﬀects total eﬀort
by (16), with both terms on the rhs negative if (19) holds; total eﬀort is an
inferior good. In a symmetric contest, the eﬀect is given by (17) and therefore
negative (as 2  0). The intuition is once again that an increase in wealth
lowers the marginal benefit of eﬀort, resulting in lower eﬀort to win the rent.
Proposition 5 If (19) holds, a common increase in wealth decreases total
eﬀort in the ability contest model. With equal wealth, a common increase in
wealth always decreases the eﬀorts of both players.
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We now discuss the eﬀects of wealth inequality. As in the privilege con-
test, we first observe that there is no systematic relationship between wealth
inequality and eﬀort in the ability contest model. Indeed, decreasing inequal-
ity in the sense of making the poor richer, or increasing inequality in the sense
of making the rich richer, both decrease total eﬀort. We then examine the
eﬀect of a small MPS in wealth. In the appendix, we prove the following
theorem.
Theorem 4 Consider the ability contest model with linear cost of eﬀort. The
sign of the quadratic form (10) is positive iﬀ
∆00
∆0
∆0
∆
− 22  0 (20)
With CARA preferences,  = −∆00∆0 = −∆0∆ , and the first term becomes
1. With quadratic preferences, ∆00∆0 = 0, and the first term vanishes. Under
CRRA, it can be shown that the first term of (20) has the following Taylor
expansion
1 + 
 (1 +
1
12
³ 

´2
) +(
³ 

´3
)
We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 In the ability contest model, a small MPS in wealth increases
total eﬀorts iﬀ (20) is positive. This is never the case with quadratic prefer-
ences. Under CARA, this happens iﬀ   1√
2
. When  has CRRA , this
happens if  
q
1
24
+1

¡
12 + ( )2
¢
.
Recall that  measures the decisiveness of the contest. These results
suggest that with a suﬃciently low contest decisiveness, aggregate eﬀort rises
following the introduction of a small wealth inequality. We finally turn to
the rent-seeking contest model.
5 The rent-seeking contest model
In the rent-seeking contest model, both rent and eﬀort are monetary. This
model can then accommodate many contest-type situations including lobby-
ing, marketing, and litigation activities where both the rent and the eﬀort
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have a direct monetary counterpart.8 In this model, player ’s expected util-
ity equals
Π( +  − ) + (1−Π)( − ) (21)
The concavity of (·) is usually interpreted as risk aversion (Cornes and Hart-
ley 2012), and we retain this interpretation in what follows.
We proceed as before and first characterize the best responses. For player
, ( ), is now defined by
1(( ) )∆ −0 = 0
11(( ) )∆ − 21(( ) )∆0 +00  0
where 0 and 00 denote expected marginal utility and its second-order
equivalent ( =  ). Simple computations show that
1 = − 12∆ − 2∆
0
11∆ − 21∆0 +00 , and (22)
2 = − 1∆
0 −00
11∆ − 21∆0 +00 .
Unlike the privilege and ability contest models, an increase in wealth has
an ambiguous eﬀect on the best-response function. The reason is that addi-
tional wealth reduces both the marginal benefit of winning the rent and the
(expected) marginal cost of eﬀort.
Similarly, player ’s best response ( ) satisfies the necessary first-
and second-order conditions
−2( ( ))∆ −0 = 0
−22( ( ))∆ + 22( ( ))∆0 +00  0
Diﬀerentiating with respect to  and , we obtain
1 = − −21∆ + 1∆
0
−22∆ + 22∆0 +00 , and
2 = − −2∆
0 −00
−22∆ + 22∆0 +00 .
8We observe that the economics literature on contests has traditionally (and often
implicitly) assumed that both the rent and the eﬀort are monetary. For instance, an
important focus in this literature has concerned the rate of rent dissipation, i.e., Σ ,
which assumes that the rent and the eﬀorts are expressed in the same units, typically a
monetary unit.
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At a symmetric equilibrium, 12 = 0, and therefore, 1 1  0. Hence, at a
symmetric equilibrium

 =
2
1− 11 and

 =
12
1− 11 
and we may claim that  |SE ≷ 0 ≷  |SE if 2 ≷ 0.
Note that the sign of 2 is given by the sign of its numerator, which upon
using the first-order condition for  can be written as
0
µ∆0
∆ −
00
0
¶
 (23)
Let us now define two lotteries: a uniformly distributed lottery e =U( −
 −+ ) and a binary lottery e = (−+  12 ;− 12), so that
the term in round brackets can be written as9
−00(e)
0(e) − −
00(e)
0(e) 
Given the binary lottery (e) is a MPS of the uniform lottery (e), the sign
of 2 is positive (resp. negative) if the MPS of a background risk increases
(resp. decreases) the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. Let us introduce
the following definition.
Definition 1 Let Ω be the class of utility functions so that a MPS of a
background risk increases absolute risk aversion.
It sounds intuitive that additional background risk should induce greater
risk aversion, i.e.,  ∈ Ω. Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1996) show,
however, that the conditions on  so that extra background risk makes an
agent more risk averse are complex, involving restrictions on higher-order at-
titudes towards risk, such as the degree of temperance of , i.e., −0000000. A
necessary condition for  ∈ Ω is that risk aversion increases when a zero-mean
background risk is introduced. Gollier and Pratt (1996) called this condition
“risk vulnerability” and it is a stronger condition than the familiar DARA
(decreasing absolute risk aversion).
9
R −+
− 0() 1d = 1∆ and
R −+
− 00()1d = 1∆0.
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For a small rent, a second-order Taylor approximation of the term in the
round bracket in (23) helps us understand why DARA is necessary in our
problem for wealth to increase eﬀort. Let () def= ∆00 −∆00. Then(0) = 0, 0(0) = 0, and 00(0) has the sign of  − . Therefore, DARA
ensures that 00(0) ≥ 0. The intuition for this result may be given as follows.
Investing in a contest is very much like gambling, where one spends money to
increase the probability of winning the monetary prize. For the same reason
that gambling activities should be reduced under increased risk aversion, ef-
forts in a contest should also be reduced with increasing risk aversion (Treich
2010). By a similar reasoning, an increase in wealth –which reduces risk
aversion under DARA– should increase eﬀort in a contest.
We now use these results to compare the eﬀorts of the rich and the poor
within an equilibrium. If  ∈ Ω, then   0   at a symmetric equi-
librium as 1  0. Hence, Theorem 1 allows us to conclude that for  ∈ Ω,
in an asymmetric rent-seeking game    implies   , and therefore
12  0.
As a result,  ∈ Ω ensures that an isolated increase in ’s wealth will raise
that player’s equilibrium eﬀort level. The equilibrium reaction of the poorer
agent, , is negative. As before, aggregate eﬀort will increase iﬀ 1 + 1  0.
For the rent-seeking contest model, this condition is equivalent to
21 − 22
−2 +
22 − 1
−2
∆0
∆ +
00
0  0
m
( ) +
µ
1 +
Φ0()Φ()
Φ()Φ0()
¶µ
−∆
0
∆
¶

∙µ
−
00
0
¶
−
µ
−∆
0
∆
¶¸

(24)
We know that the rhs is positive if  ∈ Ω. But as the second lhs term is
positive, ( )  0 is no longer suﬃcient for 1 + 1  0.
If the poor person becomes wealthier, that player’s eﬀort changes with
2
1−11 , which is positive if  ∈ Ω (the reasoning is the same as for 2). The
rich agent’s equilibrium eﬀort changes with 12
1−11 . From (22), it transpires
that 1  0 iﬀ 12−2  −∆
0∆ . Since the sign of 12 depends on that of −, a
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necessary condition for  to increase eﬀort is that  is suﬃciently richer than
. As ’s wealth approaches that of , the latter will begin to reduce eﬀort
despite the fact that  is increasing eﬀort. The two eﬀort levels then turn into
strategic substitutes. Thus, in the rent-seeking contest model, the nature
of the strategic interaction depends on the wealth levels. This possibility
of strategic substitutability also blurs the eﬀect of  on aggregate eﬀort.
Indeed, a similar argument as above shows that 1 + 1  0 iﬀ
11 − 12
1 −
21 − 2
1
∆0
∆ +
00
0  0
m
( ) +
µ
1 +
Φ0()Φ()
Φ()Φ0()
¶µ
−∆
0
∆
¶

∙µ
−
00
0
¶
−
µ
−∆
0
∆
¶¸

Given   1, the first lhs term is negative (see Figure 1, but with  now
on horizontal axis). The rhs is positive if  ∈ Ω. Once again, the positive
second lhs term blurs the inequality. We summarize these results as follows.
Proposition 7 Suppose that  ∈ Ω. In a rent-seeking contest model with
unequal wealth, the rich player exerts more eﬀort than the poor player. An
isolated increase in the wealth of the rich player increases that player’s eﬀort,
but reduces the poor player’s eﬀort. An isolated increase in the wealth of the
poor player increases that player’s eﬀort. With “suﬃcient wealth inequality”,
an isolated increase in the wealth of the poor player also increases the eﬀort
of the rich player.
The CARA utility function satisfies the conditions for Ω “just” (since
background risk has no eﬀect on absolute risk aversion under CARA). Hence,
it provides a boundary case where 2 = 0 and 2 = 0, which is easily checked
as both −∆
0∆ and
−000 equal the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. The
quadratic utility function provides another case where 2 = 0 and 2 = 0.10
In both cases, aggregate eﬀort is unaﬀected by an isolated increase in wealth.
With a common increase in wealth, aggregate eﬀorts change with 2 2
1−1 .
Hence,  ∈ Ω ensures that uniform growth in wealth will increase the repre-
sentative agent’s eﬀort. We summarize this discussion as follows.
10Observe that e = e = −+ 12. If () = − 22, then −00 ()0() = −00 ()0() =
1−(−+ 12 ) .
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Proposition 8 If  is CARA or quadratic, an isolated and therefore a com-
mon increase in wealth leaves equilibrium eﬀorts unaﬀected in the rent-seeking
contest model. In a symmetric rent-seeking contest model, a common increase
in wealth increases equilibrium eﬀorts under  ∈ Ω.
Figure 4 illustrates the diﬀerent wealth eﬀects occurring under  ∈ Ω.
Point A is a symmetric equilibrium where  =  = . A common increase
in wealth moves the equilibrium to D. Point B is an asymmetric equilibrium
with  = b   = . The move from B to E is then because of an
increase in  from b to :  increases, but  falls. Conversely, the move
from B to C is because of an increase in  from  to b. While raising ,
this leads to a fall in , illustrating the abovementioned ambiguity when
wealth, and thus eﬀort, are suﬃciently close.
Figure 4. Equilibria in the rent-seeking model for diﬀerent wealth
combinations.
We finally discuss the eﬀect of wealth inequality on aggregate eﬀort in
the rent-seeking contest model. For the reason discussed earlier, there is no
eﬀect of wealth distribution across players under CARA or quadratic utility.
The following theorem is proven in the appendix.
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Theorem 5 Consider the rent-seeking contest model. The sign of the quadratic
form (10) is positive iﬀ
21111 + 411212 + (3112 − 111) 213 + 4314  0 (25)
where
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µ000
00 − 2
∆0
∆
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∆0
∆
¶

2 = ∆
0
∆
∙∆0
∆
µ00
0 −
∆0
∆
¶
− 
00
0
µ000
00 −
∆00
∆0
¶¸

3 =
µ00
0 −
∆0
∆
¶2

4 =
µ∆0
∆
¶2 ∙∆00
∆0
µ∆0
∆ −
00
0
¶
+
00
0
µ000
00 −
∆00
∆0
¶¸

With CARA preferences, all ratios in 1 2 3, and 4 coincide with
−, and therefore the four terms equal zero. The same is true for quadratic
preferences, () =  − 
2
2.11 In the appendix, we prove the following
theorem.
Theorem 6 With CRRA preferences and small  , the inequality (25) is
violated.
We can therefore summarize our findings as follows.
Proposition 9 Consider the rent-seeking contest model. Under CARA and
quadratic preferences, a MPS in wealth does not aﬀect aggregate eﬀort. Under
CRRA preferences, when the stake of the contest,  , is small, a small MPS
in wealth reduces aggregate eﬀort.
None of the preferences considered in Proposition 9 (i.e., quadratic, CARA,
and CRRA) result in larger aggregate eﬀorts. At the same time, these
three types of preferences share a non-negative third derivative of (·) (“pru-
dence”). This suggests that a negative third derivative (“imprudence”) may
be a necessary condition for a MPS in wealth to raise aggregate eﬀort. This
conjecture is supported by the following example.
11In that case, ∆ = ∆(1 − ), ∆0 = −∆, ∆00 = 0, 0 = 1 − , 00 =
−000 = 0, where ∆ =  and  =  −  + 12. Then ∆
0
∆ =
00
0 = − 1− and
∆00
∆0 =
000
00 = 0. Once again, all four terms vanish.
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Example 1 Suppose that () =  − 
2
2 + 
3
3 with  = 1
15
and  ≤ 2
1000
,
such that 00()  0 for all   15. Then for a rent-seeking contest model
with  = 10  = 1 = 1, and for  ∈ [−002 0], a MPS in wealth results
in higher aggregate eﬀorts, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Results for cubic preferences.
 ∗  
-.0025 .2519 -.0967 -.2077
-.0020 .2508 -.3161 .0033
-.0015 .2504 -.5368 .0004
-.0010 .2502 -.7578 .00009
-.0005 .2501 -.9789 .00001
0 .25 -1.2 0
.0005 .24994 -1.4212 -.0000026
.0010 .24990 -1.6423 -.0000020
.0015 .24987 -2.0848 -.0000000
The columns respectively provide the values of the “prudence coeﬃcient” , the equilib-
rium eﬀort (∗), the value of the second-order condition (), and the value of the lhs
of (25) ( ).
6 Other wealth eﬀects
A few studies have discussed the eﬀect of wealth in strategic models of con-
tests. These eﬀects diﬀer significantly from those considered in this analysis.
In this section, we present a short summary of these other wealth eﬀects
studied in the literature.
But first let us briefly discuss the issue of redistributive politics (as men-
tioned in the Introduction). Redistributive politics may be interpreted as a
contest where  is a transfer from the loser to the winner. One may think
that this transfer could introduce a new wealth eﬀect in our diﬀerent mod-
els. That is not the case as our three contest models can accommodate this
interpretation, given a basic change in notation.12
12The change in notation can be defined as follows. In the privilege contest model,
let  = ( − ) + Π + (1 − Π)(−) = ( − ) + Π0 with 0 = 2 and a re-
normalisation. In the ability contest model, let  = Π[( + )− ( − )]− () =
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Che and Gale (1997) examine the eﬀect of budget constraints in a basic
contest model as in (1). They show that each agent’s equilibrium eﬀort is
a weakly-increasing function of the agent’s budget constraint, and that the
presence of budget constraints lowers aggregate eﬀort. Therefore, if one nat-
urally assumes that a wealthier agent is less budget-constrained, wealth has
a positive eﬀect on eﬀort.13 The eﬀect of a budget constraint can be inter-
preted as an extreme utility curvature of  at zero. However, in Che and Gale
(1998), as the utility function is otherwise linear, there are no wealth eﬀects
when wealth changes occur within the bounds of unconstrained eﬀorts, i.e.,
using our notation, when   . Moreover, Che and Gale’s (1998) model
does not capture the eﬀect that wealthier agents may have a lower marginal
benefit of obtaining rent.
Hirshleifer (1991) studies the so-called “paradox of power”. In its weak
form, this paradox states that the final distribution of wealth will have less
dispersion than the initial distribution of wealth. In its strong form, it states
that there should be equal initial and final distributions of wealth. Hirshleifer
(1991) considers a two-player contest model in which the payoﬀ of agent 
is, using our notation, is written as follows:
 = ( )[( − )1 + ( − )1]
where the quantity within the bracket is interpreted as the aggregate produc-
tion in the economy with  ≥ 1 a “complementarity index” parameter in the
production functions of the two agents (and where  is defined analogously).
It is easy to see that when  = 1 then the model is symmetric; eﬀorts are thus
equal, implying that the strong paradox of power holds, i.e.,  = .
Hirshleifer (1991) then presents numerical examples for various values of 
and the decisiveness parameter  for which the paradox of power in its weak
form does, or does not, hold. The key diﬀerence to our model is that in Hirsh-
leifer’s (1991) model, the rent, i.e., aggregate production, is endogenous and
increases with wealth. As a result, the rich player always exerts (weakly)
more eﬀort than the poor player as the marginal utility of exerting eﬀort is
(weakly) lower. In fact, the ability contest model we introduced displays a
Π[(0 + 0) − (0)] − () with 0 =  − . In the rent-seeking contest model, let
 = Π( +  − ) + (1−Π)( −  − ) = Π(0 + 0 − ) + (1−Π)(0 − ).
13Note, however, that in an all-pay auction, the introduction of budget constraints may
surprisingly increase eﬀort (Che and Gale 1998).
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much stronger form of the paradox of power compared to Hirshleifer’s (1991)
model. Indeed, in the ability contest model, the poor player always exerts
strictly greater eﬀort, in absolute terms, than the rich player.
A related model is the “winner take all with limited liability” model
introduced in Skaperdas and Gan (1995). Essentially, using our notation
again, the agent’s payoﬀ in this model writes as follows
 = Π( − )
An interpretation of this model is that the loser “dies” and obtains utility
(0) = 0. Although Skaperdas and Gan (1995) are uninterested in the ef-
fect of wealth (but study that of risk aversion), it is easy to understand that
wealth has a positive eﬀect in this model. The intuition is that the two eﬀects
we have identified go in the same direction in Skaperdas and Gan’s (1995)
model. Wealth decreases the marginal cost of eﬀort (as usual), but wealth
also increases the marginal benefit of eﬀort. Indeed, this last eﬀect simply
means that it “pays oﬀ” more to be alive when wealthier. It is also possible
to show that a rich player always exerts more eﬀort than the poor in the
two-player version of Skaperdas and Gan’s (1995) model.
Finally, we discuss Grossman’s (1991) model of insurrections.14 Grossman
(1991) considers a general equilibrium model in which agents choose how to
devote their time between production, soldiering (for the government) and in-
surrection. This implies that income (generated by production) and conflict
expenditures are endogenously determined in equilibrium. Grossman (1991)
is especially interested in how the equilibrium depends on the exogenous
CSF properties. Typically, the more favourable to a successful insurrection
is the parameter in the CSF, the larger is the fraction of time devoted to
insurrection as opposed to production. As a result, there is an equilibrium
associating low wealth and high conflict expenditures. A key insight from
this model is that participation in soldiering increases with the opportunity
cost of fighting. In a contest model, this eﬀect could be somehow captured
14This model has been influential in the conflict literature and has been used as a bench-
mark to understand the relationship between wealth and conflict (Azam 2006, Chassang
and Padro-i-Miquel 2009, Besley and Persson 2012). However, this model is significantly
diﬀerent from the standard Tullock (1980) contest model and the few extensions studied in
our analysis. We thus merely present some key insights of the Grossman (1991)’s model,
and attempt to relate them to the results we obtain.
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by allowing the cost of eﬀort, () using our notation, to depend directly
on wealth . This dependence could reflect that the marginal cost of con-
scription is higher in rich countries. This eﬀect may then counteract the
other possible positive eﬀect of wealth on conflict. To see this, consider the
following payoﬀ function
 = Π()− ( )
Then wealth has a positive eﬀect, both on the marginal benefit of eﬀort,
through  when  0  0 (as in Hirshleifer 1991 and Skaperdas and Gan 1995),
and also on the marginal cost of eﬀort, through  when   0. However,
it is unclear which eﬀect prevails. For instance, taking  and  linear in ,
then the two eﬀects cancel each other out. This point has been observed,
and extensively discussed, in Fearon (2007).
7 Discussion and conclusion
Archetypes of contests are usually found in warfare. The old Latin saying
(often attributed to Cicero) “pecunia nervus belli” (i.e., money is the sinews
of war) suggests that wealth plays an instrumental role in warfare. However,
there exist elements of contests in many economic activities, and one may
wonder if and under what conditions wealth is also instrumental in those
activities. In this paper, we inquire about the eﬀect of wealth in economic
models of contests. The simplest conclusion we can oﬀer is that there does not
exist an unambiguous relationship between wealth and eﬀorts in any contest.
Most significantly, we have seen that this relationship is strongly “contest-
dependent”. Therefore, there is no theoretical support to argue generally
without qualification that the rich should be expected to lobby more, nor
that low economic growth and inequality increase conflict.
The more precise answer is that wealth eﬀects critically depend on the
nature of the rent and of the type of eﬀorts exerted in a contest. It depends
in particular on whether the rent and/or eﬀorts can be expressed in monetary
terms. We have especially stressed the importance of the property of decreas-
ing marginal utility of wealth. This property plays a fundamental role in our
analysis through two basic eﬀects. First, wealth decreases the marginal cost
of monetary eﬀort. Second, wealth decreases the marginal benefit of winning
monetary rent. The first eﬀect tends to increase eﬀorts in a contest, as we
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have shown in the “privilege contest” model. The second eﬀect tends to de-
crease eﬀorts, as we have shown in the “ability contest” model. Therefore,
the disparate eﬀects of wealth in contests that we colloquially discussed in
the introduction may well reflect these two fundamentally opposing forces
that our models identify.
However, these basic eﬀects go in an opposite direction when both the
rent and eﬀorts are monetary. Therefore the total eﬀect of wealth is com-
plex and potentially limited, as we have shown in our “rent-seeking contest”
model. In the special, but common, case of a CARA utility function, the two
eﬀects exactly oﬀset each other, and wealth therefore has no impact on ef-
fort. Moreover, we have shown that wealth increases eﬀort in the rent-seeking
contest model under the assumption on the utility function that more back-
ground risk increases risk aversion. This assumption involves higher-order
derivatives of the utility function, and is stronger than DARA. All of these
results are summarized in Table 2 below.
Table 2. Summary of wealth eﬀects in the privilege, ability, and rent-seeking
contest models under  ≥ .
Contest models: Privilege Ability Rent-seeking
Rich vs poor  −  + − +
Isolated increase in   + − + − − −(+)
 + − ?
Isolated increase in   + + ? + − +(+)
 + − ?
Common increase  |
=
d=d + − +(+)
 |
=
d=d + − +
“Small” MPS in wealth  |
=
d=d ? ? ?Symbols + and − indicate the sign of the eﬀects mathematically described in the sec-
ond column. Symbol ? indicates that this sign is indeterminate (but may be determinate
under more restrictive assumptions on the CSF and/or the utility function, cf. results in
the paper). In the rent-seeking contest model, we assume  ∈ Ω (cf. Definition 1).
We have also studied the eﬀects of wealth inequality. These eﬀects are the
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most complex and indeterminate in general. To illustrate, take the privilege
contest model. In this model, an isolated increase in wealth always increases
aggregate eﬀort. Therefore, a decrease in inequality (through an increase in
the wealth of the poor) or an increase in inequality (through an increase in
the wealth of the rich) both increase aggregate eﬀort. Thus, wealth redis-
tribution, i.e., transferring money from the rich to the poor, combines the
first eﬀect and the opposite of the second eﬀect (for a fixed total wealth).
It thus essentially involves two opposing eﬀects, and it is diﬃcult to sign
the eﬀect of such a MPS in wealth without further restricting the functional
form. In fact, we have shown in our three contest models that the eﬀect
of a MPS in wealth depends on the property of the CSF, as well as on the
higher-order derivatives of the utility functions of wealth. Interestingly, these
results stand in sharp contrast with the neutrality result concerning the eﬀect
of wealth redistribution in the celebrated private provision of public goods
model (Bergstrom, Blume and Varian 1986). An implication of our analysis
is that the consequences of a wealth redistribution policy in terms of political
stability and social peace are by no means obvious.
To conclude, let us add that there exist some natural extensions to our
results. To start with, one may wish to consider other CSFs, an arbitrary
number of players, other dimensions of heterogeneity (e.g., on the cost or
value of rent), and to assume that the rent itself depends on wealth. One
may also want to explore welfare eﬀects. This could be interesting in that
an increase in the wealth of one or more players need not have an a priori
positive eﬀect on overall welfare despite increasing utility. This is because
of the strategic eﬀects that may serve to increase overall eﬀort. However, a
general study of welfare eﬀects in contest models must also explicitly discuss
to which extent eﬀorts are socially (un)productive. Finally, it could also be
interesting to explore the dynamic eﬀects: wealth aﬀects conflict, which in
turn aﬀects wealth, and so on. Such a dynamic analysis would permit a
better understanding of the relationship between power and money.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Power-logistic contest success functions
In this appendix, we display the properties of the (power-)logistic CSF used
to derive our results. Let
( ) = Φ()Φ() + Φ() 
where Φ is strictly positive, strictly increasing, and concave. The derivatives
of ( ) are as follows
1 = Φ
0()Φ()
(Φ() + Φ())2  0 and 2 = −
Φ()Φ0()
(Φ() + Φ())2  0
12 = (Φ()−Φ())Φ
0()Φ0()
(Φ() + Φ())3  0 iﬀ   
11 = Φ()(Φ
00()(Φ() + Φ())− 2Φ0()2)
(Φ() + Φ())3  0
22 = −Φ()(Φ
00()(Φ() + Φ())− 2Φ0()2)
(Φ() + Φ())3  0
Moreover, we have
( ) def= 12 − 22−2
=
Φ()2Φ00()− Φ()Φ0()Φ0() + Φ()[Φ0()Φ0()− 2Φ0()2 + Φ()Φ00()]
Φ()(Φ() + Φ())Φ0()
which is strictly negative under  ≥  and Φ00 ≤ 0. Similarly, 11−121 =( ) is strictly positive under  ≤  and Φ00 ≤ 0.
The power-logistic CSF for player  is given by
( ) = 

 + 
where   0. The derivatives of ( ) are (where SE= denotes evaluation
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at  =  = )
1 = ΠΠ
SE
=
1
4

  0 and 2 = −

ΠΠ
SE
= −1
4

  0
12 = 
2
ΠΠ(Π −Π)  0 iﬀ    and
SE
= 0
11 = 2[−1 +( − )]
SE
= −1
4

2
22 = 2ΠΠ[1−(Π −Π)]
SE
=
1
4

2
111 = 23ΠΠ −
2
3 ΠΠ
2 +
2
3 Π
2Π − 
2
3 ΠΠ(Π −Π)
+
2
3 ΠΠ[−1 +(Π −Π)](Π −Π)− 2
3
3 Π
2Π2
SE
=
1
2

3 −
1
8
3
3
122 = 22(Π −Π)− 2
3
2Π
2Π2 SE= −18
3
3
112 = 
µ
12 − 2 1
¶
(Π −Π) + 2 
3
2Π
2Π2 SE= 18
3
3
For future reference, we also note that
3112 − 111 SE= 1
2

3 (
2 − 1)
9.2 Existence and uniqueness in asymmetric contests
This section builds on the literature on contests to identify conditions ensur-
ing the existence of a unique pure Nash equilibrium in the privilege, ability,
and rent-seeking contest models.
Proposition 10 There exists a unique equilibrium:
i) in the privilege contest model, if −
00(−)
0(−)  Φ
00()
Φ0() ;
ii) in the ability contest model, if 
00()
0()  Φ
00()
Φ0() ;
iii) in the rent-seeking contest model, if (·) has non-increasing absolute
risk aversion and Φ00()  0.
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We follow the proof of Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997). They show
that there always exists a unique equilibrium when the form of the payoﬀ
function for each player  can be written as follows:
 = P
  − () with 
0  0 and 00  0
In the privilege contest model, we obtain this form of the payoﬀ function
under the following change in variable () = −( −Φ−1()). Then it
is immediate that 0  0, and that 00  0 iﬀ −00(−)0(−)  Φ
00()
Φ0() .
In the ability contest model, we obtain the above form of the payoﬀ
function under the following change in variable () = (Φ−1()((+)−
())). Then it is immediate that 0  0, and that 00  0 iﬀ 00()0()  Φ
00()
Φ0() .
Therefore, under 00  0 and 00  0, note that the conditions i) and ii)
hold as soon as Φ is concave.
Finally, Yamazaki (2009) proves that there always exists a unique equi-
librium in the rent-seeking contest model under non-increasing absolute risk
aversion and Φ concave.
9.3 The condition 1− 11  0 and the stability condi-
tion
Throughout our analysis, we have assumed that the condition 1 − 11  0
is satisfied. We first show that this is always the case in the privilege and
ability contest models, and then resort to a stability condition which ensures
that is the case as well in the rent-seeking contest model.
In the privilege contest model, we have 1 = 12()00(−)−22() and 1 =12()
−00(−)−11() so that 1 and 1 have opposite signs. This implies11  0 and the condition is satisfied.
Similarly, in the ability contest model, we have that 1 = −12()22() and
1 = −12()11() , which also have opposite signs so that 11  0 and the
condition is also satisfied
In the rent-seeking contest model, 1 and 1 need not have opposite signs,
and the condition 1 − 11  0 is not necessarily verified. We thus im-
pose a stability condition, i.e., |11|  1, which ensures that the condition
1 − 11  0 is indeed satisfied. See Nti (1997) for a discussion of a re-
lated stability condition and of similar assumptions made in the literature
on strategic contest models.
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9.4 Proof of Theorems 1 and 2
Proof of Theorem 1
We need to prove that (i)  =  =⇒ ()  () , then (ii)   =⇒ ( )  ( ). Since ( ) = ( ) (i.e.,
the unique equilibrium is the symmetric equilibrium), it follows from (i) that
()
 |=  () |=. If for some   , we have ( ) ≤( ) this implies, due to the continuity of best responses, that there
exists  ∈ ( ], such that ( ) = ( ) and () |= ≤()
 |=, contradicting (i). Hence, we must have (ii) ( ) ( ). The case with reverse inequalities can be proved in an analogous
fashion. This proves Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 2
For a symmetric equilibrium,
 = (( ) ) and  = (( ) )
These expressions may be solved for the reduced form expressions for equi-
librium eﬀort:
 =  ( ) and  =  ( )
Theorem 2 is now proven with the help of two lemmas.
Lemma 1 A small redistribution in wealth d = −d =  increases ag-
gregate eﬀort  +  iﬀ 11 − 212 + 22 evaluated at () is positive.
Proof of Lemma 1
Starting from an equal wealth distribution () the new eﬀort level for
player  following a transfer  from  to  is then
(+ −) =  (+ −) '  ()+(1−2)+1
2
(11−212+22)2
where  means the partial w.r.t. the th argument and all derivatives are
evaluated at (). Likewise, the new eﬀort level for player  is approxi-
mately
(+ −) =  (− +) '  ()−(1−2)+1
2
(11−212+22)2
Hence, aggregate equilibrium eﬀorts are equal to
( +   − ) + ( +   − ) ' 2 () + (11 − 212 + 22)2
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Lemma 2 At a symmetric equilibrium,
11 − 212 + 22 = (2)
211 − 2(1 + 1)212 + (1 + 1)222
(1 + 1)(1− 21 ) 
where  () denotes the first- (second-)order partial w.r.t. arguments  ().
Proof of Lemma 2
Let ( ) be the best-response function for agent , and ( ) be
the best-response function for agent . Then
 = (( ) )
Implicit diﬀerentiation then gives
d = 11d + 2d + 12d
1 =  =
2(( ) )
1− 1(( ) )1( )
2 =  =
1(( ) )2( )
1− 1(( ) )1( )
Diﬀerentiating one more time gives
11 = 1
1− 11
½
211  + 22
+
2
1− 11
∙µ
111  + 12
¶
1 + 111 
¸¾
=
1
1− 11
½
211 2
1− 11 + 22
+
2
1− 11
∙µ
111 2
1− 11 + 12
¶
1 + 111 2
1− 11
¸¾
12 = 1
1− 11
½
21
µ
1  + 2
¶
+
2
1− 11
∙
11
µ
1  + 2
¶
1 + 1
µ
11  + 12
¶¸¾
=
1
1− 11
½
21
µ
1 12
1− 11 + 2
¶
+
2
1− 11
∙
11
µ
1 12
1− 11 + 2
¶
1 + 1
µ
11 12
1− 11 + 12
¶¸¾
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22 = 1
1− 11
½
11
µ
1  + 2
¶
2 + 1
µ
21  + 22
¶
+
12
1− 11
∙
11
µ
1  + 2
¶
1 + 1
µ
11  + 12
¶¸¾
=
1
1− 11
½
11
µ
1 12
1− 11 + 2
¶
2 + 1
µ
21 12
1− 11 + 22
¶
+
12
1− 11
∙
11
µ
1 12
1− 11 + 2
¶
1 + 1
µ
11 12
1− 11 + 12
¶¸¾
At a symmetric equilibrium, 12 = 21 = 21 = 12, 1 = 1, 2 = 2, and
22 = 22. Then, using the above expressions, it can be shown that
11 − 212 + 22 = (2)
211 − 2(1 + 1)212 + (1 + 1)222
(1 + 1)(1− 21 ) 
The numerator is a quadratic form in the Hessian of the best-response func-
tion (2 1): £ −2 1 + 1 ¤ ∙ 11 1212 22
¸ ∙ −2
1 + 1
¸

The denominator will be positive under the stability assumption: |11| =
|21 | = 21  1 =⇒ |1|  1.
The proof of Theorem 2 then follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 2.
9.5 Proofs of Theorems 3, 4, and 5
For all three models, we can say that the first- and second-order conditions
for agent  are given by
(  ) = 0
1(  )  0
Hence, the optimal responses to d and d are given by

 = −
2
1 and

 = −
3
1 .
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The second-order responses are then given by
2
2 =
(−21 )
 +
(−21 )


 (26)
=
µ
− 11
¶"
22 − 22112 +
µ2
1
¶2
11
#
(27)
2
 =
(−21 )
 +
(−21 )



=
µ
− 11
¶ ∙
23 − 2113 −
3
121 +
2
1
3
111
¸
(28)
2
2 =
(−21 )
 +
(−21 )



=
µ
− 11
¶"
33 − 23113 +
µ3
1
¶2
11
#
 (29)
Proof of Theorem 3
For the privilege contest model, we have the following -functions:
 = −0( − ) + 1 = 0
1 = 00( − ) + 11  0
2 = −00 3 = 12 SE= 0
11 = −111 − 000  12 = 000  13 = 112
22 = −000  23 = 0 33 = 122
With the help of (27)-(29), the partials of ( ) can then be computed
11 =
µ
− 31
¶¡−000 211 + (00)2111¢ 
22 =
µ
− 31
¶
12221
12 =
µ
− 31
¶
00112 (00 + 11) 
Given 3 = 0, we obtain that 1 = 0 and 1 + 1 = 1. Applying Theorem 2
then obtains that the sign of the quadratic form (10) is given by the sign of
 (111 − 3112)−  
2
11
1 
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where  def= −00(−)0(−) and  def= −
000(−)
00(−) . Making use of the expressions for
the -derivatives gives
1
2

3
¡
1−2¢−  1
4

3 
This proves Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 4
For the ability contest model, we obtain the following expressions for the
 function
 = ∆ [( + )− ()]− 
0 = 0
1 = 
2
2∆ − 
00  0
2 = ∆
0 3 = 
2
∆
SE
= 0
11 = 
3
3∆ − 
000  12 = 
2
2∆
0
13 = 
3
2∆ 22 =

∆
00
23 = 
2
∆
0
SE
= 0 33 = 
3
2∆
where ∆ def= [( + )− ()]. Assuming that 00 = 000 = 0, and making
use of (27)-(29), we obtain the following curvatures for the best-response
function:
22 =
µ
− 131
¶¡1∆0021 − 2111(∆0)21 + 21111∆0∆¢ 
11 =
µ
− 131
¶
122∆21
12 =
µ
− 131
¶
(−1121∆0∆1) 
Given 3 = 0, 1 = 0 and 1 + 1 = 1, application of Theorem 1 gives that
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the sign of the quadratic form (10) is given by the sign of
(111 − 3112) 1
211 −
∆00∆0 − 2∆
0∆³
−∆0∆
´ 
Under the power-logistic probability function, the lhs reduces to 2(1−2).
This proves Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 5
For the rent-seeking contest model, the -functions are given by
 = 1∆ −0 = 0
1 = 11∆ − 21∆0 +00  0
2 = 1∆0 −00 3 = 12∆ − 2∆0 SE= 1∆0
11 = 111∆ − 311∆0 + 31∆00 −000
12 = 11∆0 − 21∆00 +000
13 = 112∆ − 212∆0 + 2∆00 SE= 112∆ − 1∆00
22 = 1∆00 −000  23 = 12∆0 − 2∆00
33 = 122∆ − 22∆0 SE= −112∆ + 11∆0
where ∆ def= (+−)−(−). With the help of these derivatives
and expressions (27)-(29), the curvatures 11 12 22 for ’s best-response
function are computed. Using Theorem 2, and simple, but tedious, factor-
ization, it can be shown (the Maple files are available from the authors upon
request) that the sign of the quadratic form 11− 212 + 22 can be written
as
1

£21111 + 411212 + (3112 − 111) 213 + 4314¤  (30)
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where
1 = 
00
0
µ000
00 − 2
∆0
∆
¶
− ∆
0
∆
µ∆00
∆0 − 2
∆0
∆
¶

2 = ∆
0
∆
∙∆0
∆
µ00
0 −
∆0
∆
¶
− 
00
0
µ000
00 −
∆00
∆0
¶¸

3 =
µ00
0 −
∆0
∆
¶2

4 =
µ∆0
∆
¶2 ∙∆00
∆0
µ∆0
∆ −
00
0
¶
+
00
0
µ000
00 −
∆00
∆0
¶¸
 and
 =
µ
11 − 1∆
0
∆ + 1
00
0
¶µ
11 − 31∆
0
∆ + 1
00
0
¶2

Note that  is negative given the term in the first round brackets can be
written as 1∆ +


∆0
∆ and both 1 and ∆0 are negative because of the
second-order condition and risk aversion, respectively. This proves Theorem
5.
9.6 Proof of Theorem 6
The first-order condition for  is given by (  ) = 0, where
(  ) = ( ) [( +  − )− ( +  − )]
−[( )( +  − ) + (1− ( ))( − )]
At a symmetric equilibrium ( =  = ), () = 14  and ( ) = 12 .
Using for () the CRRA form, () = 1−
1− , and taking a Taylor expansion
of degree 2 around  = 0, results in
( ) ' (−)−
∙
−1 +
µ
1
4

 +
1
2

 − 
¶
 −
µ
1
8



 −  +
1
4
(1 + )
( − )2
¶
2
¸
Equating the rhs to zero and solving for  gives three roots, with the real
solution being 1
4
+(3) (in fact 1
4
 is the solution to the case of quadratic
preferences). Replacing  by 1
4
, the obtained expressions for 1 2 3, and
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4 are then Taylor-approximated around  = 0:
1 = 1
2
(1 + )
4 
2 +(3)
2 = 1
3
2(1 + )
5 
2 +(3)
3 = (3) and
4 = 2
3
3(1 + )
6 
2 +(3)
Next, the coeﬃcients with 1 2, and 4 are computed using the earlier
derived expressions for the probability function and its derivatives, and eval-
uating them at  = 1
4
. Finally, the numerator of (30) is computed. Up
to a negative proportionality factor, it is equivalent to
1− 2
3
³
 
´
+
1
2
³
 
´2 
The expression has no real roots and is always positive. Hence, for CRRA
preferences and a rent that is small w.r.t. the initial wealth , a small MPS
in wealth reduces aggregate eﬀort. This proves Theorem 6.
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